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Abstract
We test the theoretical claim that coordination and centralisation
in wage setting reduce strike activity by estimating nonlinear regres-
sion models using a dataset of 17 OECD countries for the period
1972-2000. We find moderating effects of coordination on strike ac-
tivity but the effects are not stable over time. Several means are
employed to check for the robustness of our results. We compute
bootstrapped standard errors, conduct nonlinear median regressions.
A remaining problem of the study is that we cannot control completely
for country-specific heterogeneity in the estimates of coordination and
centralisation effects.
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1 Introduction
The moderating effects of centralisation in wage bargaining on strike activity
are considered as a stylised fact by many economists (Hoel, Moene, & Waller-
stein, 1993, p. 103. Berthold & Fehn, 1996, p. 82). The theoretical rationale
is based on Hicks’ (1962) observation that strikes cannot occur in bargain-
ing models based on perfect symmetric information, since rational agents
can agree ex ante on the outcome resulting after a strike and thus avoid a
harmful/costly strike. If strikes are caused by uncertainty and asymmetric
information, centralisation of wage setting should have a moderating effect
since wage setting at higher levels is based on aggregate and consequently
more ‘objective’ data (e.g. productivity growth data provided by statistical
offices) and these data are (symmetrically) available to all bargaining par-
ties. Modern theoretical models of strikes (see e.g. Kennan & Wilson, 1989,
1990, 1993) are in line with this reasoning: Strikes serve as screening devices
to extract private information (regarding profits, strike funds, willingness to
strike of the work force etc.) of the opponent.
The popular information asymmetry argument is complemented with the no-
tion of self serving bias put forward by Babcock & Loewenstein (1997). They
criticise the ‘rational agents assumption’, by arguing that direct involvement
in negotiations biases perceptions (of fairness) in favour of the own position.
As a consequence, the sum of claimed shares in the whole cake (the sum in
dispute) is typically greater than one. In the light of the (mainly experimen-
tal) evidence cited in Babcock & Lowenstein’s article, centralisation may help
decreasing strike activity if centralised bargaining is conducted by more spe-
cialised and professional negotiators. Babcock & Lowenstein, however, put a
question mark behind this interpretation by stressing that professionals are
not necessarily immune against self serving bias.
Though the relation between centralisation in wage setting and strike activ-
ity seems to be clear in theory, empirical evidence on the issue is rare. The
only exceptions seem to be Cameron (1984) and Schnabel (1993). Cameron
finds positive (bivariate) correlations between strike activity (measured as
lost days due to strikes per year and workers) and the macroeconomic indi-
cators inflation, unemployment and growth rate of earnings. Schnabel (1993)
obtains significant negative rank correlations between strike activity and the
centralisation indicators of Calmfors & Driffill (1988) and Bruno & Sachs
(1985) for a cross section data set of OECD countries.1
1Two further contributions provide rather indirect evidence. Lesch (2002) computes
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Though the theoretical literature on bargaining is mainly concerned with
centralisation (measured as the dominant level of bargaining) empirical con-
siderations and studies suggest that the degree of coordination (more im-
portantly) between and within the bargaining parties matters as well. A
glance at the data shows that national labour markets differ significantly
with respect to the degree of coordination, and that the correlation between
centralisation and coordination is only moderate. Furthermore the effects of
coordination and centralisation in strikes appear to be quite different at the
descriptive level. In table 1 we have listed mean and median strike duration
by coordination and centralisation. To this aim we have sorted the countries
intro three groups according to their scores in the OECD centralisation and
coordination indicators.2
In the upper panel of table 1 the relation between centralisation and strike
volume is u-shaped for the mean as well as for the median, favouring the
intermediate level. With respect to coordination the relation is hump-shaped
for the mean and monotone decreasing for the median, clearly favouring
high degrees of coordination. A further important stylised fact from simple
descriptive measures (lower panel of the table) regards the clear negative
trend. Since these effects may, however, be generated by spurious correlations
(i.e. are not partial effects), we have to apply regression techniques in order
to disentangle matters.
2 Outline of the Empirical Model
We explain strike-volume (lost working days per 1000 workers and year due
to strike actions) by indicators for coordination or the level of centralisation
of bargaining and several control variables (explained below). Our choice
of coordination and centralisation indicators is OECD04 (2004) (cf. also
OECD, 1997). The indicators CO und CE represent the dominant level and
degree of coordination of the bargaining parties. Table 5 in the appendix
bivariate correlations between strike incidence and an index of institutional regulations on
bargaining (peace clauses, compulsory arbitration, statutory work councils, legal admissi-
bility of lockouts and general strikes) but fails to detect significant effects, and Ochel &
Selwitschka (2003) point to a decreasing trend in strike activity for OECD countries. The
interesting paper Goerke & Madsen (2004) exploits strike volume data from 1903-1999
(with gaps) to test several institutional and political theories. Their main institutional
variable (ideological orientation of the government), however, captures only possible influ-
ences of the political background.
2The indicators are characterised and described in more detail below.
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Table 1: Days lost due to strikes per thousand workers and year.
mean median Q0.25 Q0.75 min max
indicator of centralisation (OECD)
low 231.2 118.0 21 315 1 1316
intermed. 184.4 40.0 3 199 0 1980
high 269.1 107.5 21 332.5 0 2007
indicator of coordination (OECD)
low 285.6 185.0 51 403 10 1293
intermed. 348.2 160.5 54 332 0 1980
high 147.7 24.0 3 152 0 2007
period strike activity by periods
1971–1980 368.2 202.5 21 482 0 2007
1981–1990 191.8 84.0 7.5 266 0 1353
1991–2000 66.1 30.0 6 72 0 1317
Source: IW Ko¨ln, OECD (2004), own computations.
shows the values of the indicators for the countries in our estimation sample.
Further details on the definition and measurement of the indicators are given
below. Our data set covers 17 OECD countries for the period 1972-2000.
All specifications contain the following control variables: standardised un-
employment rate (UN) inflation rate (INFL), output gap (GAP )3, union
density rate (DEN) together with an interaction term for Ghent systems4
(DENG = DEN × I(Ghent system)), an openness indicator (OPEN , com-
puted as sum of exports divided by GNP), and lagged wage growth rates
(WGR). To allow for further variability, the coordinatin and centralisation
indicators are interacted with dummies for the decades 1972-1980, 1981-1990
and 1991-2000. This enables us to test explicitly whether the influence of
the centralisation indicators is stable over time.
3Unfortunately, the output gap series provided by the OECD and the IMF are not
available for all countries and the whole period of our sample. Therefore we compute an
output gap as the relative difference between actual real output (GDP) and its smooth
trend (generated by the Hodrick-Prescott Filter, with smoothing parameter value 50 for
all countries).
4unemployment insurance is in some countries organized by unions implying that union
membership is necessary to obtain insurance. Since a part of workers then joins unions
mainly to be insured, union density is a bad indicator for union bargaining power in these
countries. The interaction term is included to control for this heterogeneity.
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3 Data Problems and Specification Issues
3.1 Data Problems
We anticipate that our estimations suffer from several problems which are
common to empirical studies of centralisation effects.5 The first and most
crucial one stems from the fact that our centralisation and coordination mea-
sures have (at most) ordinal scale level, show only little variation in the time
dimension and changes are often not clear-cut. Therefore it is impossible
to identify coordination effects in a standard fixed effects regression design.
We use two alternatives instead. In the first we include only three dummies
(interacted with dummies for the three decades) for low, medium and high
centr./coord., in the second we include dummies for all countries (interacted
with dummies for the three decades) and identify centralisation effects as
differences between the respective group (low, medium and high) means of
dummy coefficients. Consequently our centralisation effects are a mixture of
difference and level effects.
Since we cannot eliminate country-specific heterogeneity completely, neglect
of possibly relevant regressors remains an important problem. We do not
include some variables representing the institutional and legal framework
of bargaining since comparable and reliable data are not available for the
whole sample. These are dummies for statutory work councils, compulsory
strike ballots, allowance of lock-outs and political strikes, peace clauses, and
compulsory arbitration.6
We think, however that the neglect of these variables does not generate seri-
ous bias in our estimates since most of these variables are directly related to
our measures for centralisation and coordination of bargaining, and it is likely
that many of these regulations are mainly responses of the political system
to the prevailing bargaining institutions. For example, the viability of polit-
ical strikes depends at least indirectly on the coordination of unions, since
5We mention only some important studies from the literature: Bruno & Sachs (1985)
Calmfors & Driffill (1988), Layard, Nickell, & Jackman (1991), OECD (1997), Iversen
(1998, 1999), Elmeskov, Martin, & Scarpetta (1998) and Haffner, Nickell, Nicoletti, Scar-
petta, & Zoega (2001). For (almost complete) surveys on the issue see Flanagan (1999),
Aidt & Tzannatos (2002) and Booth et al. (2001).
6We checked the relevance of these dummy control variables by including them into
explorative estimations for the subsample of European countries and found (surprisingly)
neither individually significant effects nor joint significance (F-test for all these dummies).
These checks do not allow us to give the clear-all, however, since the sample for these
estimations relates to a relatively homogenous subsample of the data.
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highly decentralised unions lack the structure to organise political strikes.7
Therefore political strikes (which generate extreme strike volumes in some
years) should be considered as a by-product of coordination, and it would be
‘unfair’ to net them out by using dummies for political strikes. If we do not
control for these variables we have, however, interpret the centralisation and
coordination dummy coefficients very carefully. They have to be considered
as measures for the bargaining system in a more comprehensive sense, i.e.
including the legal and political environment.
Further disclaimers regard our measures of centralisation and coordination in
bargaining. They are complex phenomenons and therefore resist persistently
to researchers’ operationalisation and measurement attempts. As regards
centralisation, bargaining can take place at several levels: the national, re-
gional, sector, industry, firm, plant or occupation level. From a theoretical
point of view it is impossible to give a unique ordering of this list (just try
to rank the regional and industry level with respect to centralisation). Addi-
tionally, measurement is complicated significantly if bargaining is conducted
at different levels simultaneously (in Germany we observe a combination of
industry and regional bargaining). If these problems were resolved, we would
have (at least in Germany) to inspect several thousand collective wage agree-
ments because they may differ significantly in scope (e.g. density of workplace
an remuneration regulations).
The measurement of coordination appears even more challenging because co-
ordination is often realised tacitly or customarily, i.e. without formal binding
contracts, and tacit coordination detracts itself from observation. Even if the
observability problem were absent, many dimensions of coordination had to
be accounted for: The degree of coordination on the employer and union
side may differ and coordination may be realised in different forms: vertical
(creation of umbrella organisations) or horizontal integration (associations).
Furthermore similar forms of coordination and organisation do not necessar-
ily imply a similar distribution or concentration of power. While umbrella
organisations in the highly centralised countries possess sweeping powers, i.e.
are able to sign binding contracts on behalf of their member organisations
and have control over strike funds, their functions in decentralised countries
are typically reduced to services for and exchange of information between
the member organisations. Finally, the union and employer side may show
different degrees of concentration.
7Teulings & Hartog (1998) advance the hypothesis that centralisation and the legal
framework both are essentially observable ‘incarnations’ of underlying social preferences.
And they provide ‘soft’ evidence in favour of their hypothesis.
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These short remarks suggest that it is difficult to obtain objective and reli-
able measures of centralisation. Starting with Blyth (1979), Schmitter (1981),
Crouch (1983), Cameron (1984), Bruno & Sachs (1985), and Tarantelli (1986)
empirical work on centralisation has produced a large number of indicators.
Calmfors & Driffill (1988), OECD (1997), Kenworthy (2001) and Aidt &
Tzannatos (2002) provide comparisons. Kenworthy (2001) combines a com-
parison of indicatores with a sensitivity analysis of their effects in regression
models for the unemployment rate and finds that the results of empirical
models respond sensitively to the choice of indicators in some cases. We
choose the OECD indicators from the large pool of indicators since they
are used by many other studies (on the relation between centralisation and
wages/unemploymeent/employment) and capture at least important discrete
changes of centralisation in the last thirty years. Most other indicators which
are not updated since their creation would urge us to put hands-on and in-
troduce additional subjectivity. Though theory does not provide much guid-
ance on further relevant regressors, coverage (share of workers covered by
collective wage agreements) suggests itself as a control variable. We did not
include coverage rates into the model, since they appear to be less relevant
than density rates from a theoretical point of view. Besides that they are
highly correlated with union density, but measured less precisely. Therefore
we expect that including them will add little information to our model but
generate significant collinearity problems.
A glance at a plot of the strike data reveals their main characteristics and
the implied problems. Figure 1 visualises the high volatility of our depen-
dent variable and considerable differences between countries.8 These sudden
changes and significant variations are contrasted by a relatively smooth de-
velopment of our regressors. Two explanations suggest themselves to fill this
gap. The first and most unpleasant one appeals to effects caused by unob-
served or unobservable variables. The second one appeals to nonlinearity.
Bias caused by unobserved variables cannot be eliminated. If they are re-
sponsible for the extreme observations of the dependent variable, this bias
can be reduced somewhat by application of robust estimators. Our choice is
the least absolute deviations (LAD) estimator. The LAD estimator β min-
imises the sum of absolute deviations |yit−β xit| putting smaller weight than
OLS estimates on points located far away from the regression line.
8A disclaimer regarding the comparability if strike data is in order here. Lesch (2002)
and Schnabel (1995) point to the fact that strike data are censored from below at the
firm level in the USA because only strikes with more than 1000 days lost are reported.
According to Lesch and Schnabel this may lead to an underestimation of the true strike
activity by 30%.
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Figure 1: Lost days due to strikes per 1000 employees and year, 17 OECD-
countries
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Interestingly, the second candidate for the high volatility of strike volume in
face of smooth regressors, nonlinearity, is supported loosely by theoretical
reasoning. While screening models predict moderate strike durations (see
e.g. Kennan & Wilson, 1989, 1990, 1993 for surveys), the sum in dispute
is likely to be ‘burned down’ completely in attrition games, implying long-
lasting strikes. This substantial difference in the outcome is caused by an
inconspicious change of the rules: In screening games proposals are possible
only within fixed time intervals, while the length of a bargaining round is
9
chosen by the agents in signaling and attrition games. An alternative expla-
nation for high volatility appears if we abandon the assumption of rationality.
Everyday life is full of casual evidence for the self-energising structure of es-
calation. If emotions play a significant role, mistaken demands or offers may
be misinterpreted by the opponent as provocative action and answered by
excessive responses. Consequently small changes in the environment may
lead to large spikes in the strike volume.
Before we discuss our suggested economotric solutions to tackle the major
data problems we have to mention a minor censoring problem in the data.
The reported strike duration is zero for 31 out of 461 observations.9 In prin-
ciple, the censoring problem could be solved by application of appropriate
estimation procedures (ML-Tobit, Symmetrically Censored Least Squares
(SCLS), Censored Least Absolute Deviations (CLAD), Heckman-Selection).
We abstain from using such procedures for two reasons. Firstly, two of these
estimators (ML-Tobit and Heckman-Selection) are based on strong (and un-
realistic) assumptions regarding the structure of error terms and respond
quite sensitively to violations. Secondly, our Box-Cox estimates shown be-
low suggest significant deviations from a linear model which cannot be rep-
resented in standard tobit-type models.10 Since the censoring problem is
negligible in our application (less than 7% of all observations are censored)
but the functional form issue appears to be crucial, we decided to drop the
zero-censored observations.
3.2 Specification Issues
The Box-Cox transformation suggests itself as a tool to tackle the nonlinear-
ity problem in our application. It creates considerable flexibility but imposes
less computational burden and mild identification requirements. The speci-
9Contracting without strikes is distributed very unevenly over the countries: 14 zero
observations come from Switzerland, 12 from Austria, three from Sweden, and one from
the Netherlands and Germany.
10Note however, that a Box-Cox transformed variable cannot be zero. Consequently
the Box-Cox transformation is – strictly speaking – senseless for samples containing zero
values of the dependent variable. Only Heckman’s selection model makes it possible to
combine the transformation of the dependent variable with a consistent modelling of zero
observations. As is well known from the empirical literature, however, it rests on strong
assumptions regarding the error terms and suffers from severe identification problems in
most applications.
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fication proposed by Box & Cox (1964) has the form
yλ − 1
λ
= Xβ + u. (1)
Depending on the scaling parameter λ it allows a continuous transition from
the linear case (λ = 1) to a logarithmic transformation (λ → 0) of the de-
pendent variable. We estimate the model (after appropriate transformation
with a Jacoby-factor, see Carroll & Ruppert, 1988 or Powell, 1996) by non-
linear least squares (NLS).11 The corresponding nonlinear LAD estimates are
computed in a computationally efficient two-step method proposed by Cham-
berlain (1994), Buchinsky (1995) and Fitzenberger, Wilke, & Zhang (2004).
Exploiting the equivariance property of quantiles with respect to a positive
monotone transformation, βλ can be estimated from model (1) which is linear
for given λ. The optimal λ is obtained from minimisation of the L1−Norm
of the inverted Box-Cox formula
|y − (1 + λXβλ)1/λ
which amounts to a nonlinear but univariate (and therefore straightforward)
minimisation problem.12 Fitzenberger et al. (2004) point to the problem
that the second step is viable only if the expression in brackets 1 + λX β is
strictly positive for all observations. To assure this, they propose to use only
observations for which this condition is met in all optimisation steps for both
boundaries of an interval [λ, λ¯] which has to be fixed in advance. We choose
λ = 0.0 and λ¯ = 1.5.13
A third problem present in almost all cross country studies concerns depen-
dencies between residuals. The residuals show considerable serial as well as
between-panel correlation.14 As is well known, the standard OLS covari-
ance matrix formula σ2 (X ′X)−1 produces biased results then. If panel data
11Below we point to problems associated with GLS or GMM estimation in small samples.
Because of this we do not apply Powell’s rescaled GMM estimator.
12Simultaneous estimation of λ and β from (1) is not possible since the nonsense solution
λ = −∞, β = (0, . . . , 0) minimises the objective function. For further details see the cited
literature.
13The lower bound λ is a compromise in our application because values of λ < 0 generate
an excessive loss of observations due to the selection rule. On the other hand the estimated
λ falls short of the lower bound zero in about 1 percent of the bootstrap iterations. At
least for these resamples, λ has to be decreased. Since we compute (nonparametric) 90
percent confidence intervals, the lower confidence bound (the 5% percentile) is not affected
by these cases, and can therefore be ignored.
14Serial correlation for the linear regressions computed below is about 0.5, and about
20% of the entries in the between panel correlation matrix of residuals are above 0.5.
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are available (as in our case), correct estimation of the covariance matrix
is straightforward (see Greene, 2000, section 13.9). Though the estimated
covariance matrix of the residuals could in principle be used to compute an
efficient GLS estimate, we do not follow this approach here because of the
warnings in Beck & Katz (1995). The authors show in a simulation study
that GLS estimates respond sensibly to biased estimation of the residual co-
variance matrix and GLS standard errors typically are biased downwards.
This may cause severe problems, especially if the cross section dimension of
the sample is small. At least for linear models application of the sandwich
formula V (βˆ) = (X′X)−1(X′ΩˆX)(X′X)−1 is straightforward (and for lin-
ear models readily implemented in Stata). Here we apply a (design-matrix)
moving-blocks bootstrap15 instead for two reasons. Firstly, for the nonlinear
LAD models a similar approach would require parametric or nonparamet-
ric conditional density estimation of the residuals. While the parametric
approach runs counter to the spirit of the robust semiparametric LAD pro-
cedure, the nonparametric approach suffers from the well known curse of
dimensionality. Secondly, and more importantly, the bootstrap appears to
produce more reliable results for small samples and samples with outlying
observations. To retain the serial and panel correlation structure of the resid-
uals we draw two-dimensional blocks of length four in the time direction and
length six in the cross section dimension. A formal description of the proce-
dure is given in the appendix.
4 Estimation results
Our estimations are based on yearly observations for the period 1972–2000
for the OECD countries Austria, Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Germany,
Finland, France, United Kingdom, Italy, Japan, Canada, New Zealand, the
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the USA.16
As theory does us not tell which of the two indicators (centralisation or co-
ordination) is more important for strike activity, the standard econometric
15David & Hinkley (1997) and Vinod (1993) provide surveys on the issue, Fitzenberger
(1997) contains a thorough analysis of the moving blocks bootstrap for least squares and
quantile regression models.
16There are three gaps in the strike data for. Belgium (1981-1984, 1986-1987, 1999.
Furthermore our wage growth data (source: OECD) start in 1977, 1977 and 1978 for
Australia, Norway and Switzerland. We checked the effect of this data loss by dropping
the (insignificant) wage variable from the set of regressors and found only small effects on
other regressors.
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strategy to answer the question were to include both indicators in a re-
gression and let standard errors or p-values decide. Unfortunately this is
not viable since the indicators are highly correlated (see table 5 in the ap-
pendix). Therefore we follow the custom to estimate separate models for
both indicators.
As should be clear from the above remarks regarding the operationalisation
and measurement of coordination (and centralisation), the available indica-
tors can be measured sensibly at most by an ordinal scale. The OECD uses a
discrete ordinal scale ranging from 1 to 5. To obtain valid regressor variables,
we recoded the indicators into three dummies: low coordination corresponds
to value 1, intermediate coordination to 2-3, and high coordination to 4-5.
As explained above we interacted the coordination dummies with dummies
for the decades to allow for (restricted) time-variability of the considered
effects. The recoding of the indicators to dummy variables introduces a sub-
jective component since the researcher has to determine the grouping. The
definition of groups is, however, restricted by the distribution of positions
in the original measure. As can be seen from the table in the appendix, a
grouping scheme of the form 1-2, 3, 4-5 would leave the medium category of
the coordination indicator empty for some decades.
To start with, consider the results of the Box-Cox regressions for coordination
in table (2). The table is nonstandard in two respects. Firstly, it contains
p-values instead of t statistics or standard deviations of coefficients.17 The
reason for this choice is that p-values based on the quantiles of the distri-
bution of bootstrap coefficients are more robust than the other inference
measures. Secondly, since the coefficients of the transformed modell have no
direct intuitive interpretation we report average group and average marginal
effects of the regressors on the dependent variable are given instead of the
coefficients themselves.
The average group effect for the k−th dummy regressor dk is
AV GE(dk) =
1
C T
∑
i,t
[yˆi,t]dk=1 − [yˆi,t]dk=0
where C, T are the number of countries and years, respectively, and [yˆi,t]dk=j
denotes the prediction from the (inverted) Box-Cox model yi,t = {1+λ (xi,tβ+
17The bootstrap p−values are computed as solutions to Qp(bk) = 0 where Qp(bk) is the
p−quantile of the empirical distribution of the k−th coefficient bk. Since it is (with 1000
bootstrap resamples) unlikely to find a bootstrap realisiation of bk which is exactly zero,
we search for the root of an interpolation function Qˆp(bk) instead.
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²ˆi,t)}1/λ with the k−th dummy set to j (and all other variables take on their
empirical values). The average marginal effect AVME of the k−th continu-
ous regressor xk is
AVME
(
∂y
∂xk
)
=
1
C T
∑
i,t
[
∂y
∂xk
]
i,k
=
bk
C T
∑
i,t
{
1 + λ (xi,tb+ ²ˆi,t)
}1/λ−1
.
Note that the residuals do not cancel out here.
Because of their paramount relevance for specification issues, the estimates of
the transformation parameter λ are reported in table 4 in the appendix. The
estimates of λ vary between 0.07 to 0.19 (depending on specification). Note
that the upper bounds of 95% confidence intervals are far away from unity,
giving clear evidence against the linear specification. While the estimated
values of λ differ somewhat with respect to the estimation procedure, the
choice of the institutional proxy (in the group-specific effects specification)
seems to be irrelevant. Furthermore the NLS procedure delivers more precise
results than NLAD.
As already mentioned in the text above, we estimate models with group-
specific and country-specific fixed effects. Each of these models is estimated
with transformed NLS and NLAD. Table 2 shows the results for the group-
specific, 3 the results for the country-specific fixed effects model. Since the
differences between the tranformed NLS and NLAD model are small to mod-
erate in most cases, we interpret only the NLS results.
Regarding the continuous ‘control’ variables we find that size and significance
of coefficients differs considerably between the group- and country-specific fe
models. They are, however, not generally smaller in the country-specific
effects model. The most important differences exist for the unemployment
rate and the inflation rate. Since the country-fe specification is less restric-
tive this suggests that the high impacts of these variables seem to be caused
by misspecification, i.e. they capture a good deal of country-specific het-
erogeneity. The output gap, union density and openness indicator remain
significant even in the country-fe specification with expected sign. Surpris-
ingly, lagged wage growth is highly insigificant (and even positive). This
contradicts microeconometric evidence (see e.g. Card (1990)) from the USA
and Canada. Possible explanations are, a) that our business cycle proxy
(GAP ) does not capture all relevant cycle effects, and b) that – especially in
the more centralised countries – several important industrial conflicts (fol-
lowed by dramatic strikes) are not triggered by wage demands but (e.g. in
Germany) related to working time and vacation regulations or are (at least
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Table 2: Mean marginal Effects for the Box-Cox transformation model,
group-specific fixed effects specification. Dependent variable: strike volume.
Coordination Indicator Centralisation Indicator
NLS Estimates NLAD Estimates NLS Estimates NLAD Estimates
Variable coeff. p-val coeff. p-val. coeff. p-val coeff. p-val.
UN−1 39.79 0.00 35.57 0.00 55.37 0.00 52.99 0.00
INF−1 22.82 0.00 18.46 0.00 28.08 0.00 27.33 0.00
GAP−1 26.83 0.00 23.22 0.00 31.85 0.00 25.86 0.01
DEN−1 6.11 0.00 7.29 0.00 4.11 0.01 3.42 0.01
DENG−1 -1.84 0.05 -3.11 0.01 -1.17 0.17 -1.02 0.09
OPEN−1 -4.38 0.00 -2.74 0.01 -4.81 0.01 -5.07 0.01
WGR−1 8.55 0.23 3.89 0.35 12.74 0.13 8.47 0.19
C70L 526.00 0.00 439.73 0.00 404.15 0.00 364.83 0.12
C80L 189.58 0.04 93.31 0.38 94.17 0.22 13.6 0.27
C90L 45.08 0.24 3.38 0.38 6.88 0.36 -15.25 0.12
C70M 673.52 0.00 546.1 0.00 271.03 0.07 294. 0.32
C80M 77.66 0.38 -0.09 0.35 -21.63 0.23 -53.86 0.10
C90M 15.88 0.47 -37.57 0.17 -10.00 0.23 -22.6 0.08
C70H 73.22 0.36 -51.1 0.26 177.99 0.31 53.96 0.36
C80H 1.44 0.31 -151.63 0.04 144.53 0.21 43.04 0.35
C90H -13.36 0.2. -85.77 0.07 17.75 0.43 19.65 0.28
Differences between ‘regimes’
C70M − C70L 147.52 0.00 106.37 0.86 -79.83 0.03 -70.83 0.18
C80M − C80L -111.93 0.03 -93.40 0.21 -67.45 0.02 -67.46 0.11
C90M − C90L -29.20 0.19 -40.94 0.21 -7.34 0.26 -7.34 0.34
C70H − C70L -452.79 0.00 -490.83 0.00 -310.88 0.04 -310.88 0.04
C80H − C80L -188.15 0.01 -244.93 0.05 29.43 0.45 29.43 0.46
C90H − C90L -58.44 0.09 -89.15 0.16 34.90 0.53 34.90 0.53
Number of observations: 430
CdL, C
d
M , C
d
H : dummy for medium and high degree of coord./cent. in decade d
decades: 70 : 1972-1980, 80 : 1981-1990, 90 : 1991-2000
UN−1: lagged unemployment rate, INFL−1: lagged inflation rate
GAP−1: lagged output gap, DEN−1: lagged union density
DENG: = DEN× dummy for Ghent system
OPEN−1: lagged trade openness indicator, WGR−1: lagged wage growth
indirectly) directed against governments restricting union power by creating
or tightening bargaining regulations.18
Note that the impact of the significant variables is (at least in the more
trustable country-fe model) only moderate. The output gap is measured in
percent, implying that a one percent increase of the difference between actual
18Important examples are anti-union policies of Reagan in the USA and Thatcher in
UK.
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and potential GDP increases strike volume by about 15 (days per year and
thousan workers). With an average range of about 5 percent for the output
gap cyclical variation of strikes amounts to about 75 days.
Finally note that the continuous regressors cannot explain the decrease of
strike volume in the considered period. The output gap shows no trend by
construction. Union density and opennes both show large between-country
differences.19 But time-variation is rather small. Average union density
decreased from about 45 percent in the seventies to about 40 percent in
the nineties, opennes increases from 21 to 33 percent. This implies that
increasing opennes is responsible for a 120 day decrease of strike volume in
the considered period.
Regarding the central regressors of our investigation we find significant neg-
ative effects for high coordination (compared to low coordination), i.e. high
coordination decreases the strike volume. However, the most important thing
to note here seems to be that the size of the effect decreases considerably from
about -450 (group-fe model) or about -200 (country-fe model) in the seventies
to about -50 in the nineties.
Evidence is less clear for the centralisation indicator. Here the medium levels
seem to have an advantage but significant effects exist only in the country-fe
model in the seventies and eighties.
5 Conclusion
Though the coefficients for the centralisation and coordination indicators
are estimated rather imprecisely and disclaimers regarding the validity and
reliability of the used institutional indicators are in order, our investigation
shows that high levels of coordination had significant moderating effects on
strike activity in the considered period. However, the impact of coordination
on strike activity shows a clear decreasing trend, i.e. the less coordinated
countries have catched up in the three decades.
For the continuous macro variables which acted mainly as controls in our
study we find only small impacts on strike volume, suggesting that the insti-
19Average density is about 75 and 80 percent for the most organised labour markets in
Denmark and Sweden but under 20 percent in the least organised in the USA and France.
The openness indicator ranges from unter 10 percent in the USA to more than 60 percent
in Belgium.
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Table 3: Mean marginal Effects for the Box-Cox transformation model,
country-specific fixed effects specification. Dependent variable: strike vol-
ume.
NLS Estimates NLAD Estimates
Variable coeff. p-val coeff. p-val
UN−1 6.86 0.19 -3.36 0.48
INF−1 -1.31 0.48 1.66 0.16
GAP−1 14.38 0.01 8.60 0.03
DEN−1 12.91 0.00 8.26 0.01
DENG−1 -19.57 0.22 -6.41 0.41
OPEN−1 -10.75 0.01 -7.42 0.02
WGR−1 0.52 0.49 1.94 0.47
Differences between ‘regimes’, Coordination
CO70M − CO70L 479.88 0.07 481.46 0.06
CO80M − CO80L -0.921 0.47 7.73 0.43
CO90M − CO90L -10.04 0.18 -10.46 0.24
CO70H − CO70L -207.30 0.05 -215.0 0.04
CO80H − CO80L -154.60 0.00 -153.84 0.02
CO90H − CO90L -49.99 0.00 -44.70 0.02
Differences between ‘regimes’, Centralisation
CE70M − CE70L -61.91 0.05 -61.53 0.09
CE80M − CE80L -103.66 0.00 -103.60 0.01
CE90M − CE90L -0.53 0.24 5.11 0.38
CE70H − CE70L -161.23 0.13 -171.28 0.13
CE80H − CE80L 23.-78 0.38 19.80 0.49
CE90H − CE90L 51.65 0.34 71.61 0.46
Number of observations: 430
COdH − COdL: difference of group effect between high and low coordination in decade
d. The group effect COdx is computed by averaging over all dummy effects of countries
belonging to group x.
We do not report the group averages of the country-specific fixed effects since they are
similar to the group specific intercepts COdi in table 2.
decades: 70 : 1972-1980, 80 : 1981-1990, 90 : 1991-2000
UN−1: lagged unemployment rate, INFL−1: lagged inflation rate
GAP−1: lagged output gap, DEN−1: lagged union density
DENG−1: = DEN−1× dummy for Ghent system
OPEN−1: lagged trade openness indicator, WGR−1: lagged wage growth
tutional frame (including traditions) plays a paramount role for the expla-
nation of differences in both the cross-section and time dimension.
What to conclude from our results? Though we find statisticall significant
effecst of coordination in some periods and variants of the model, they are
not stable enough (over time) to create a clear case in favour of better co-
ordination. Even if our evidence were more conclusive, the observation that
17
cross-country heterogeneity plays an important role, should deter us from
demanding reforms in the less coordinated countries: Firstly, strike activity
is only one of many other labour market indicators and welfare losses due
to strikes are not large (at least in the last years). And secondly, bargain-
ing institutions depend on and interact with many other institutional, social
and economic conditions. Turning only one screw of the complex institu-
tional frame probably would deflagrate without any effects or even worse
outcomes.
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A Tables
A.1 Estimates of the Box-Cox transformation param-
eter
Table 4: Estimates of the transformation parameter λ
group-specific fixed effects specification
Indicator estimator point est. Q0.025 Q0.975
CO NLS 0.11 0.6 0.20
CO NLAD 0.18 0.10 0.57
CE NLS 0.09 0.05 0.18
CE NLAD 0.14 0.06 0.85
country-specific fixed effects specification
NLS 0.076 0.02 0.18
NLAD 0.19 0.05 0.44
Q0.025, Q0.975: 2.5% and 97.5 % percentile of bootstrap distribution of λ.
B Description of the Bootstrap Procedure
Let zi,t = [xi,t, yi,t] denote a row of the data matrix including all regressors and
the dependent variable. A time block ξi,t consists of four successive observa-
tions, i.e. ξi,t = (zi,t, . . . , zi,t+3), and a panel block ψt consists of six randomly
sampled time-blocks, i.e. ψt = (ξr1,t, . . . , ξr6,t) where the pseudo random num-
bers rj follow a discrete uniform distribution in the interval [1, . . . , N˜t,t+3]
where N˜t,t+3 denotes the number of countries with observations in period
[t, t+ 3]. In several panel data applications of the moving-blocks bootstrap,
cross-section blocks are formed according to spatial neighbourhood. Since
the spatial notion of neighbourhood is not applicable consequently in our
application (to see this try to find all direct neighbours of Australia) and
moreover residual correlations may follow a different structure, we have to
take potluck with this simple randomised design. With six out of 17 countries
the chance to retain relevant contemporaneous correlations is quite high.
23
C
o
or
d
in
at
io
n
In
d
ic
at
or
C
en
tr
al
is
at
io
n
In
d
ic
at
or
P
er
io
d
70
-7
4
75
-7
9
80
-8
4
85
-8
9
90
-9
4
95
-0
0
70
-7
4
75
-7
9
80
-8
4
85
-8
9
90
-9
4
95
-0
0
A
u
st
ra
li
a
4
4
4.
5
4
2
2
4
4
4
4
2
2
A
u
st
ri
a
5
5
4.
5
4
4
4
3
3
3
3
3
3
B
el
gi
u
m
4
3.
5
4
4
4
4.
5
4
3.
5
3
3
3
3
C
an
ad
a
1
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
D
en
m
ar
k
5
5
3
4
3
4
5
5
3
3
3
2
F
in
la
n
d
5
5
4
5
5
5
5
5
4
5
5
5
F
ra
n
ce
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
G
er
m
an
y
4
4
4
4
4
4
3
3
3
3
3
3
It
al
y
2
2
3.
5
2
3
4
2
2
3.
5
2
2
2
J
ap
an
4
4
4
4
4
4
1
1
1
1
1
1
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s
3
4
4.
5
4
4
4
3
3
3
3
3
3
N
ew
Z
ea
la
n
d
4
4
4
4
4
4
3
3
3
3
1
1
N
or
w
ay
4.
5
4.
5
4.
5
4.
5
4.
5
4.
5
4.
5
4.
5
4.
5
4.
5
4.
5
4.
5
S
w
ed
en
4
4
3.
5
3
3
3
5
5
4.
5
3
3
3
S
w
it
ze
rl
an
d
4
4
4
4
4
4
3
3
3
3
2
2
U
K
3
4
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
U
S
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Table 5: OECD indicator of bargaining coordination and centralisation.
Source: OECD (2004)
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